Gürsel Tapkı, İpek

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Gürsel Tapkı, İPek
İ.,Gürsel Tapkı
İ. Gürsel Tapkı
İpek, Gürsel Tapkı
Gursel Tapki, İPek
I.,Gursel Tapki
I. Gursel Tapki
Ipek, Gursel Tapki
Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
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Dr. Öğr. Üyesi
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Ipek.tapkı@khas.edu.tr
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Scholarly Output

2

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2

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0

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2011 - 20142
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    Article
    Citation Count: 2
    Bargaining With Nonanonymous Disagreement: Decomposable Rules
    (Elsevier Science Bv, 2011) Kıbrıs, Özgür; Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
    We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In particular, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. For them, we analyze the process through which "good" properties of rules on the Nash domain extend to ours. We then enquire whether the counterparts of some well-known results on the Nash (1950) domain continue to hold for decomposable rules on our extended domain. We first show that an extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining rule uniquely satisfies the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) properties. This uniqueness result, however, turns out to be an exception. We characterize the uncountably large classes of decomposable rules that survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977), and Thomson (1981) properties. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Article
    Citation Count: 3
    A Mechanism Design Approach To Allocating Central Government Funds Among Regional Development Agencies
    (Springer, 2014) Kıbrıs, Özgür; Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
    To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets the agencies' private information has to be taken into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement (regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is to assign all agencies the same budget set as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly we show that the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise there are no efficient strategy proof and fair mechanisms no matter how small these constraints are.