Keskin, Kerim
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Name Variants
Keskin, Kerim
K.,Keskin
K. Keskin
Kerim, Keskin
Keskin, Kerim
K.,Keskin
K. Keskin
Kerim, Keskin
K.,Keskin
K. Keskin
Kerim, Keskin
Keskin, Kerim
K.,Keskin
K. Keskin
Kerim, Keskin
Job Title
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi
Email Address
Kerım.keskın@khas.edu.tr
ORCID ID
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Turkish CoHE Profile ID
Google Scholar ID
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Scholarly Output
11
Articles
11
Citation Count
0
Supervised Theses
0
11 results
Scholarly Output Search Results
Now showing 1 - 10 of 11
Article Citation Count: 6Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions(Springer, 2019) Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, Kerim; Özcan-Tok, ElifWe study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: the first parameter can be interpreted as the effectiveness (or salience) of the reference point in determining the anchor whereas the second parameter can be interpreted as its effectiveness in shaping agents' aspirations. Utilizing these parameters we provide a unifying framework for the study of bargaining problems with a reference point. The two-parameter family of bargaining solutions we obtain encompasses some well-known solutions as special cases. We offer multiple characterizations for each individual member of this family as well as two characterizations for the whole solution family in bilateral bargaining problems.Article Citation Count: 6Time-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining(Elsevier Science, 2018) Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, KerimWe study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity to violations of their fairness judgments) decrease over time as the deadline approaches. Our results offer a new explanation to delays and disagreements in dynamic negotiations. We show that even mutually compatible fairness judgments do not guarantee an immediate agreement. We partially characterize conditions for delay and disagreement and study the changes in the length of delay in response to changes in the model parameters. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Article Citation Count: 13A Dynamic Game Theory Model For Tourism Supply Chains(Sage Publications, 2021) Keskin, Kerim; Ucal, MeltemThis article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinite-horizon repeated game arguing that agents would face the same decision problem in each week of every holiday season in each year. We show how agents in a tourism supply chain end up with higher profits in any given period of a repeated game compared with their profits in the static version of the game.Article Citation Count: 0Ters Turnuvalar(2019) Keskin, KerimBu makalede Clark ve Riis (1998b)’in iç içe geçmiş çoködüllü yarışma modelinin dinamik versiyonuna iki alternatif önerilmiştir. İlk olarak, kazananların alacağı ödüllerin sarf edilen yarışma eforları tarafından endojen olarak belirlendiği bir model çalışılmıştır. İkinci olarak, model genişletilerek bir sonsuz ufuk modeli elde edilmiştir. Önerilen modellerin alt-oyun mükemmel Nash dengeleri karakterize edilmiş olup, ilgili denge stratejileri temel alınan modeldeki denge stratejileri ile karşılaştırılmıştır.Article Citation Count: 0On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions(Economics Bulletin, 2019) Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, KerimWe study a two-stage probability weighting model [see Tversky and Fox 1995] in a first-price sealed-bid auction. We present the unique symmetric equilibrium and provide some experimental support for our model.Article Citation Count: 9Sabotage in team contests(Springer, 2019) Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, CagriIn the contest literature sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent's likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that anticipating a possible sabotage contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team's aggregate effort which in turn determines the contest's outcome. For the baseline model with no sabotage there exists a corner equilibrium implying a free-rider problem in each team. As for the model with sabotage our characterization of Nash equilibrium reveals two important results: (i) a unique interior equilibrium exists so that the free-rider problem no longer is a concern and (ii) the discouragement effect of sabotage vanishes for some players. On top of those conclusions we investigate the team owner's problems of prize allocation and team formation with the objective being to maximize his team's winning probability.Article Citation Count: 3Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model(Walter De Gruyter Gmbh, 2019) Keskin, Kerim; Sağlam, ÇağrıAlthough most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants what is arguably more important is the contestants' effective efforts which may be influenced also by their ability human capital strength etc. In this paper we investigate an extensive model including such an effectiveness parameter and analyze the optimal investment behavior in a dynamic conflict framework. At each period two contestants compete for a common prize by choosing contest efforts and investment levels. Each contestant's investment accumulates as his/her human capital which depreciates through time. Who wins the component contest at a particular period is determined by the contestants' effective efforts defined as increasing functions of their efforts and human capitals. Following the analysis of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a two-period model and of open-loop equilibrium in an infinite-horizon model we provide intuitive comparative static results.Article Citation Count: 6Multi-player race(Elsevier Science Bv, 2018) Keskin, Kerim; Karagozoglu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, CagriWe present a model of race with multiple players and study players' effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that in equilibrium once any two players win one battle each the remaining players do not exert any effort anymore. This turns the continuation game into a two-player race. This is different than the results in previous two-player models of race which report that all states of the game are reached with positive probabilities. We also provide a set of comparative static results on the effects of the number of players and the victory threshold. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Article Citation Count: 7Endogenous reference points in bargaining(Springer Heidelberg, 2018) Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, KerimWe allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points taking into consideration that with a certain probability they will not be able to reach an agreement and will receive their disagreement point outcomes whereas with the remaining probability an arbitrator will distribute the resource by using (an extended) Gupta-Livne bargaining solution (Gupta and Livne in Manag Sci 34:1303-1314 1988). The model delivers intuitive equilibrium comparative statics on the breakdown probability the loss aversion coefficients and the disagreement point outcomes.Article Citation Count: 0Converse Tournaments(Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences, 2019) Keskin, KerimThis paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.
