Keskin, KerimKeskin, KerimUcal, Meltem Şengün2021-01-272021-01-272021131096-34801096-3480https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/3744https://doi.org/10.1177/1096348020913949This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinite-horizon repeated game arguing that agents would face the same decision problem in each week of every holiday season in each year. We show how agents in a tourism supply chain end up with higher profits in any given period of a repeated game compared with their profits in the static version of the game.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessCollaborationCompetitionDynamic modelsGame theoryPackage holidaysTourism supply chainArticle304324245WOS:00053279670000110.1177/10963480209139492-s2.0-85084594656Q2Q1