Keskin, KerimKeskin, Kerim2019-06-272019-06-27201870165-48961879-31180165-48961879-3118https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/759https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.06.002We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels we present results on the existence of equilibrium and total rent dissipation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessArticle859196WOS:00045258570000810.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.06.0022-s2.0-85049632774Q4Q2