Keskin, Kerim2019-06-272019-06-27201901303-099X1303-099Xhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/604https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2019148773https://search.trdizin.gov.tr/yayin/detay/388096This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessConverse tournamentsNested multipleprize contestsTullock contestsEndogenous prizesSubgame perfect Nash equilibriumArticle3343119WOS:00045778780000310.21121/eab.2019148773N/AN/A388096