Tilev, Seniye2023-10-192023-10-1920221303-8303https://doi.org/10.18491/beytulhikme.1794https://search.trdizin.gov.tr/yayin/detay/1142170https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/4583In this paper, I discuss the legitimacy of using the term “to know” in morality and I develop an approach based on Kantian morality. In my analysis, I take the notion “to know” in the sense that Timothy Williamson does. That is to say, I regard it in opposition to the perspectives that claim “knowledge is justified true belief”. Therefore, in the first part, I briefly introduce “knowledge first epistemology”. In the second part, I build a perspective pointing to the strong correlation between acting and knowing. After that, I provide an analysis of Kantian morality in connection with my discussion. I show how Kant argues for a lawful certainty in morality that allows us to use the verb “know” (in the sense that is evaluated in the first part of this paper). In the next part, I comment on the un-analyzability of knowing in the practical sphere with reference to free will. In my conclusion, upon a general review of the paper, I introduce very briefly an alternative epistemology from Islamic thought regarding the theoretical and practical sphere distinctions.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessArticle9110611210.18491/beytulhikme.1794114217011421700