Navigating Financial Cycles: Economic Growth, Bureaucratic Autonomy, and Regulatory Governance in Emerging Markets

dc.authoridApaydin, Fulya/0000-0001-7208-5857
dc.authorscopusid57191520592
dc.authorscopusid55156913300
dc.authorwosidCoban, M. Kerem/N-2641-2014
dc.contributor.authorCoban, M. Kerem
dc.contributor.authorÇoban, Mehmet Kerem
dc.contributor.authorApaydin, Fulya
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-15T19:40:07Z
dc.date.available2024-10-15T19:40:07Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.departmentKadir Has Universityen_US
dc.department-temp[Coban, M. Kerem] Univ London, Sch Finance & Management, SOAS, London, England; [Coban, M. Kerem] Kadir Has Univ, Istanbul, Turkiye; [Apaydin, Fulya] Inst Barcelona Estudis Int, Barcelona, Spainen_US
dc.descriptionApaydin, Fulya/0000-0001-7208-5857en_US
dc.description.abstractPolitical decisions over economic growth policies influence the degree of bureaucratic autonomy and regulatory governance dynamics. Yet, our understanding of these processes in the Global South is somewhat limited. The article studies the post-Global Financial Crisis period and relies on elite interviews and secondary sources from Turkey. It problematizes how an economic growth model dependent on foreign capital inflows, which are contingent on global financial cycles, influences the trajectory of bureaucratic autonomy. Specifically, we argue that dependence on foreign capital flows for economic growth creates an unstable macroeconomic policy environment: while the expansionary episode of the global financial cycle masks conflicts between the incumbent and bureaucracy, the contractionary episode threatens the political survival of the incumbent. In the case of Turkey, this has incentivized the ruling coalition to resort to executive aggrandizement to control monetary policy and banking regulation, which resulted in a dramatic decay of the autonomy of the regulatory agencies since 2013.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities [PGC2018-093719-A-I00]en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe earlier versions of this paper were presented at ECPR General Conference 2021 and the PSA General Conference in 2022. We would like to thank the participants and discussants on these occasions. We are grateful to Emmanuel Mathieu, Isik Ozel, and Kutsal Yesilkagit for their comments and feedback on the earlier versions. We are grateful to five anonymous referees whose critical and detailed suggestions have contributed to development of the article. Finally, we are thankful to David Levi-Faur for his guidance and patience since the initial submission. This study was supported by The Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, grant no. PGC2018-093719-A-I00.en_US
dc.description.woscitationindexSocial Science Citation Index
dc.identifier.citationcount0
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/rego.12621
dc.identifier.issn1748-5983
dc.identifier.issn1748-5991
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85201387151
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12621
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/6349
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001292661800001
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ1
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.scopus.citedbyCount1
dc.subjectbureaucratic autonomyen_US
dc.subjectcredit-led growth modelen_US
dc.subjectgrowth coalitionsen_US
dc.subjectgrowth modelsen_US
dc.subjectregulatory governanceen_US
dc.titleNavigating Financial Cycles: Economic Growth, Bureaucratic Autonomy, and Regulatory Governance in Emerging Marketsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.wos.citedbyCount0
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication5f0429ea-7083-4fbb-9508-7e2dc86fc44b
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery5f0429ea-7083-4fbb-9508-7e2dc86fc44b

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