Uluslararası Ticaret ve Finans Bölümü Koleksiyonu

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/67

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Browsing Uluslararası Ticaret ve Finans Bölümü Koleksiyonu by Journal "Borsa Istanbul Review"

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    Article
    Citation - WoS: 8
    Citation - Scopus: 8
    Information Cascades, Short-Selling Constraints, and Herding in Equity Markets
    (Borsa İstanbul Anonim Şirketi, 2020) Tiniç, Murat; Iqbal, Muhammad Sabeeh; Mahmud, Syed F.
    This paper examines the relationship between informed trading and herding in Borsa İstanbul. Our firm-level cross-sectional analysis asserts that informed trading can significantly increase future herding levels. Furthermore, we show that the relationship between informed trading and herding intensifies under short-selling restrictions. Our results confirm the predictions of the informational cascades framework where the individuals disregard their private information to follow others. We show that information cascades are relevant both for buy-side herding and sell-side herding. Short-selling restrictions may reinforce the herding behaviour since informed investors may not be able to clear out potential price misalignments.
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    Article
    Citation - WoS: 2
    Citation - Scopus: 3
    Profit Sharing Between Managers and Investors: an Experimental Investigation
    (Elsevier Science Bv, 2015) Öztürkkal, Belma
    This study analyzes the effect of interest and power structures and conflict of interest among managers and investors and tests the effect of different payout mechanisms on willingness to pay. In this study 74 student subjects are involved in a setting where the manager is determining his own compensation. A series of experiments that vary managers' ability to determine their own compensation and investors' ability to punish inappropriate behavior are reported. The experiments involve pairs of subjects consisting of an investor and a manager with asymmetric decision making powers. When managers compensate themselves inappropriately investors' recourse is to shun the company's shares-a model that arguably corresponds more closely to reality than the accepted efficient market traditional paradigm. The experiment shows that managers share profits even when investors cannot withhold investment and investors fairly compensate managers as well. This pattern explains both the ability of capital markets to function despite the presence of inherent moral hazard and occasional managerial misbehavior. Copyright (C) 2015 Borsa Istanbul Anonim Sirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.