Keskin, Kerim

Profile Picture
Name Variants
Keskin, Kerim
K.,Keskin
K. Keskin
Kerim, Keskin
Keskin, Kerim
K.,Keskin
K. Keskin
Kerim, Keskin
Job Title
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi
Email Address
Kerım.keskın@khas.edu.tr
Main Affiliation
Economics
Status
Former Staff
Website
ORCID ID
Scopus Author ID
Turkish CoHE Profile ID
Google Scholar ID
WoS Researcher ID
Scholarly Output

11

Articles

11

Citation Count

0

Supervised Theses

0

Filters

20192
Reset filters

Settings

Subject: Tullock contests

Scholarly Output Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Article
    Citation - WoS: 10
    Citation - Scopus: 10
    Sabotage in Team Contests
    (Springer, 2019) Dogan, Serhat; Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, Cagri
    In the contest literature sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent's likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that anticipating a possible sabotage contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team's aggregate effort which in turn determines the contest's outcome. For the baseline model with no sabotage there exists a corner equilibrium implying a free-rider problem in each team. As for the model with sabotage our characterization of Nash equilibrium reveals two important results: (i) a unique interior equilibrium exists so that the free-rider problem no longer is a concern and (ii) the discouragement effect of sabotage vanishes for some players. On top of those conclusions we investigate the team owner's problems of prize allocation and team formation with the objective being to maximize his team's winning probability.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Article
    Citation - WoS: 0
    Converse Tournaments
    (Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences, 2019) Keskin, Kerim; Keskin, Kerim
    This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.