Converse Tournaments
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Date
2019
Authors
Keskin, Kerim
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences
Open Access Color
GOLD
Green Open Access
No
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No
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Abstract
This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.
Description
Keywords
Converse tournaments, Nested multipleprize contests, Tullock contests, Endogenous prizes, Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Turkish CoHE Thesis Center URL
Fields of Science
0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences
Citation
WoS Q
Q4
Scopus Q
OpenCitations Citation Count
N/A
Source
Ege Akademik Bakis (Ege Academic Review)
Volume
19
Issue
1
Start Page
33
End Page
43
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