Converse Tournaments

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Date

2019

Authors

Keskin, Kerim

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Publisher

Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences

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Abstract

This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.

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Keywords

Converse tournaments, Nested multipleprize contests, Tullock contests, Endogenous prizes, Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

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0

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N/A

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Source

Volume

19

Issue

1

Start Page

33

End Page

43