Overlapping Regionalism in East Asia: a Case Study of Financial Cooperation in Apec, Asean and Apt

Abstract

This study's primary objective is to understand the notion of overlapping regionalism, which occurs when one state or more than one state becomes a member of more than one regional organization simultaneously. The evolving literature on overlapping regionalism lacks systematic attention to interactions among geographically overlapping regional groups. It aims to examine inter-institutional interactions among overlapping regional institutions, by revealing their characteristics and relationships and discussing the drivers leading them to overlap. It questions the extent of overlap in terms of the policy mandate, reflection of overlaps on regional cooperation agendas through overlapping regional groups, and motivation behind overlaps and conditions preventing the merging of these regional organizations into one single framework. These questions are answered through the case study of East Asian financial regionalism, in which three different cooperation processes have been carried out under the geographically overlapping ASEAN, APT, and APEC since the 1990s and which has not been studied from the perspective of overlapping regionalism. To meet the research objective, the present research targets the exploration and mapping of the discourse networks among regional organizations/groups in East Asia regarding financial regionalism by focusing on shared views, divergences, and correlations on specific aims/cooperation themes in the form of discourse reflected in documents produced by APEC, ASEAN, and APT. It reaches two major conclusions. First, financial regionalism in East Asia constitutes a segmented overlapping regime complex, shaped by simultaneous relations between three financial cooperation processes carried out under APEC, APT and ASEAN. Accordingly, there is no one core regional organization defining all regional cooperation agendas and norms. As causes of this situation, it highlights the effect of rivalry among the big powers, the hedging strategies of middle and small powers, the loosely institutionalized structure of regional governance, and the different institutional priorities of each regional organization.