The Unexpected Actor? Civil-Military Relations and Regulatory Agency Control in Brazil

Abstract

Democratic backsliding around the world has sparked debate about its impact on public administration and governance. This article explores a growing yet less visible phenomenon threatening democracy. It examines the influence exerted by authoritarian populists over autonomous regulatory agencies through militarized patronage, that is, the discretionary appointment of military officers to civil positions. Scholars have not fully untangled how and why contemporary populists employ militarized patronage, and much less is known about militarization of autonomous regulatory agencies. To fill this gap, we highlight enabling factors underpinning militarized patronage and draw on a unique empirical dataset that integrates military with civil service records to account for the militarization of autonomous regulatory agencies in Brazil during the far-right presidency of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022). The article deepens our understanding of the role of civil-military relations in restructuring regulatory governance during populist rule, and the effects of democratic backsliding on regulatory governance.