Time-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining
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Date
2018
Authors
Karagozoglu, Emin
Keskin, Kerim
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Open Access Color
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Abstract
We study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity to violations of their fairness judgments) decrease over time as the deadline approaches. Our results offer a new explanation to delays and disagreements in dynamic negotiations. We show that even mutually compatible fairness judgments do not guarantee an immediate agreement. We partially characterize conditions for delay and disagreement and study the changes in the length of delay in response to changes in the model parameters. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Description
Keywords
Bargaining, Deadline effect, Delay, Disagreement, Fairness concerns, Justice sensitivity
Turkish CoHE Thesis Center URL
Fields of Science
Citation
6
WoS Q
Q3
Scopus Q
Q1
Source
Volume
147
Issue
Start Page
115
End Page
128