Time-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining

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Date

2018

Authors

Karagozoglu, Emin
Keskin, Kerim

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Elsevier Science

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Abstract

We study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity to violations of their fairness judgments) decrease over time as the deadline approaches. Our results offer a new explanation to delays and disagreements in dynamic negotiations. We show that even mutually compatible fairness judgments do not guarantee an immediate agreement. We partially characterize conditions for delay and disagreement and study the changes in the length of delay in response to changes in the model parameters. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Keywords

Bargaining, Deadline effect, Delay, Disagreement, Fairness concerns, Justice sensitivity

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Citation

6

WoS Q

Q3

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Q1

Source

Volume

147

Issue

Start Page

115

End Page

128