Populist Hyperpersonalization and Politicization of Foreign Policy Institutions

Abstract

This article explains how right-wing populist leaders in Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey have transformed their states' foreign policy institutions through personalization and politicization. We examine the transformation of foreign policy institutions in the four cases and make two contributions. First, we differentiate between disparate types of personalization by proposing the term 'hyperpersonalization'-populist leaders' reliance on security institutions in foreign policy decision-making-which distinguishes the populist transformation of foreign policy institutions in Russia and Turkey. We argue that lower levels and speed of autocratization lead to politicization combined with milder cases of personalization of the foreign policy bureaucracy, while higher levels and speed of autocratization lead to higher levels of personalization in the foreign policy institutions. Second, we lay out the steps and patterns of populist politicization and hyperpersonalization that bring 'deinstitutionalizing restructuring' to foreign policy institutions. As we illustrate, this deinstitutionalizing restructuring involves concurrent bureaucratic expansion and bureaucratic retrenchment. The process is accompanied by a populist narrative that this restructuring is done to realize the 'popular will' or to regain 'full sovereignty'. We conclude the article with the policy implications of this populist transformation of foreign policy institutions.