Reformulations of a Bilevel Model for Detection of Tacit Collusion in Deregulated Electricity Markets

dc.contributor.authorÇelebi, Emre
dc.contributor.authorŞahin, Güvenç
dc.contributor.authorEsmaeili Aliabadi, Danial
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-24T13:22:30Z
dc.date.available2020-12-24T13:22:30Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik ve Doğa Bilimleri Fakültesi, Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümüen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we consider a collusion model for competitive pool based electricity markets operated by an independent system operator (ISO), where it aims to prevent tacit collusion among generators. In order to determine the existence of tacit collusion in the market, we have employed the the game-Theoretic bilevel optimization model proposed by [1]. This model represents the market clearing mechanism, where generators determine their bids in order to maximize their profit while the system operator allocates power and determine locational electricity prices. The resulting optimization problem is a bilevel multi-criteria problem with non-linear terms, which is already complex and difficult to solve. We provide reformulations and linearization methods to obtain equivalent problems, e.g., a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), a mixed integer non-linear problem (MINLP) and a mixed integer problem (MIP). A simple 6-bus system is used to test the rate of detection for collusive states for the reformulations and the results are presented. We have found that MIP models and reformulations detect strong collusive states. This model can guide ISOs in identifying and preventing cases of generator collusion.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipTürkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştirma Kurumuen_US
dc.identifier.citation2
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/EEM.2019.8916545en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-172811257-2
dc.identifier.issn2165-4077en_US
dc.identifier.issn2165-4077
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85076750211en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityN/A
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/3655
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2019.8916545
dc.identifier.volume09/01/19en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000521338300164en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/A
dc.institutionauthorÇelebi, Emreen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIEEE Computer Societyen_US
dc.relation.journalInternational Conference on the European Energy Market, EEMen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessen_US
dc.subjectBilevel optimizationen_US
dc.subjectElectricity marketsen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectReformulationsen_US
dc.subjectTacit collusionen_US
dc.titleReformulations of a Bilevel Model for Detection of Tacit Collusion in Deregulated Electricity Marketsen_US
dc.typeConference Objecten_US
dspace.entity.typePublication

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