Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules

dc.contributor.authorKıbrıs, Özgür
dc.contributor.authorTapkı, İpek Gürsel
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-13T17:37:51Z
dc.date.available2021-02-13T17:37:51Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümüen_US
dc.description.abstractWe analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In particular, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. For them, we analyze the process through which "good" properties of rules on the Nash domain extend to ours. We then enquire whether the counterparts of some well-known results on the Nash (1950) domain continue to hold for decomposable rules on our extended domain. We first show that an extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining rule uniquely satisfies the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) properties. This uniqueness result, however, turns out to be an exception. We characterize the uncountably large classes of decomposable rules that survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977), and Thomson (1981) properties. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipTurkish Academy of Sciences TUBITAKen_US
dc.identifier.citation2
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.07.002en_US
dc.identifier.endpage161en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-80755143492en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2
dc.identifier.startpage151en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/3906
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.07.002
dc.identifier.volume62en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000297831200003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4
dc.institutionauthorTapkı, İpek Gürselen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bven_US
dc.relation.journalMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectPointen_US
dc.subjectNashen_US
dc.subjectAxiomsen_US
dc.subjectModelen_US
dc.titleBargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rulesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication

Files