Ekonomi Bölümü Koleksiyonu

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/57

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Citation - WoS: 8
Citation - Scopus: 9
Between Anchors and Aspirations: a New Family of Bargaining Solutions
(Springer, 2019) Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Özcan-Tok, Elif
We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: the first parameter can be interpreted as the effectiveness (or salience) of the reference point in determining the anchor whereas the second parameter can be interpreted as its effectiveness in shaping agents' aspirations. Utilizing these parameters we provide a unifying framework for the study of bargaining problems with a reference point. The two-parameter family of bargaining solutions we obtain encompasses some well-known solutions as special cases. We offer multiple characterizations for each individual member of this family as well as two characterizations for the whole solution family in bilateral bargaining problems.
Citation - WoS: 10
Citation - Scopus: 12
Endogenous Reference Points in Bargaining
(Springer Heidelberg, 2018) Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim
We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points taking into consideration that with a certain probability they will not be able to reach an agreement and will receive their disagreement point outcomes whereas with the remaining probability an arbitrator will distribute the resource by using (an extended) Gupta-Livne bargaining solution (Gupta and Livne in Manag Sci 34:1303-1314 1988). The model delivers intuitive equilibrium comparative statics on the breakdown probability the loss aversion coefficients and the disagreement point outcomes.
Citation - WoS: 3
Citation - Scopus: 3
Investment on Human Capital in a Dynamic Contest Model
(Walter De Gruyter Gmbh, 2019) Keskin, Kerim; Sağlam, Çağrı
Although most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants what is arguably more important is the contestants' effective efforts which may be influenced also by their ability human capital strength etc. In this paper we investigate an extensive model including such an effectiveness parameter and analyze the optimal investment behavior in a dynamic conflict framework. At each period two contestants compete for a common prize by choosing contest efforts and investment levels. Each contestant's investment accumulates as his/her human capital which depreciates through time. Who wins the component contest at a particular period is determined by the contestants' effective efforts defined as increasing functions of their efforts and human capitals. Following the analysis of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a two-period model and of open-loop equilibrium in an infinite-horizon model we provide intuitive comparative static results.
Citation - WoS: 3
Citation - Scopus: 4
A Mechanism Design Approach To Allocating Central Government Funds Among Regional Development Agencies
(Springer, 2014) Kıbrıs, Özgür; Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets the agencies' private information has to be taken into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement (regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is to assign all agencies the same budget set as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly we show that the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise there are no efficient strategy proof and fair mechanisms no matter how small these constraints are.
Citation - WoS: 16
Citation - Scopus: 20
Women's Tertiary Education Masks the Gender Wage Gap in Turkey
(Springer, 2017) Tekgüç, Hasan; Eryar, Deger; Cindoglu, Dilek
This paper investigates the gender wage gap for full-time formal sector employees disaggregated by education level. The gap between the labor force participation rate of women with tertiary education and those with lower levels of education is substantial. There is no such gap for men. Hence existing gender wage gap studies for Turkey where we observe lopsided labor force participation rates by education levels compare two very different populations. We disaggregate the whole sample by education level to create more homogenous sub-groups. For Turkey without disaggregation the gender wage gap was 13% in 2011 and women are significantly over-qualified relative to men on observed characteristics. Once we disaggregate the sample by education level we show that the gender wage gap is 24% for less educated women and 9% for women with tertiary education in full-time formal employment. Observed characteristics only explain 1 % of this gap in absolute terms. We further disaggregate the data by public and private employment. The gender gap is higher in the private sector. However women with tertiary education in the public sector are significantly better qualified compared to men and consequently the adjusted gender wage gap is higher for women with tertiary education in the public sector. Our estimates also indicate a rise in the gender wage gap between 2004 and 2011.

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