Converse Tournaments

dc.contributor.authorKeskin, Kerim
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-27T08:02:21Z
dc.date.available2019-06-27T08:02:21Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümüen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.en_US]
dc.identifier.citation0
dc.identifier.doi10.21121/eab.2019148773en_US
dc.identifier.endpage43
dc.identifier.issn1303-099Xen_US
dc.identifier.issn1303-099X
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.scopusqualityN/A
dc.identifier.startpage33en_US
dc.identifier.trdizinid388096en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/604
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2019148773
dc.identifier.urihttps://search.trdizin.gov.tr/yayin/detay/388096
dc.identifier.volume19en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000457787800003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/A
dc.institutionauthorKeskin, Kerimen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEge Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.journalEge Academic Reviewen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectConverse tournamentsen_US
dc.subjectNested multipleprize contestsen_US
dc.subjectTullock contestsen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous prizesen_US
dc.subjectSubgame perfect Nash equilibriumen_US
dc.titleConverse Tournamentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Converse Tournaments.pdf
Size:
630.17 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description: